State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 17, 2010 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
3-17-2010 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from March 17, 2010 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from March 17, 
2010 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/615 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-25956 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
JAMES P. WELCH, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
(JAMES GORMAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ), filed by the State of New York - Unified Court System (UCS). The 
ALJ held that UCS violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by unilaterally implementing a new policy regarding off-duty employment for court 
officers in a bargaining unit represented by Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). To remedy the violation, the ALJ directed 
UCS to rescind the new policy, to "compensate and/or make whole court officers for any 
loss of pay or benefits resulting from" that policy, with interest at the maximum legal 
rate, to rescind any disciplinary measures imposed on employees for failing to abide by 
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the new policy, and to sign and post a notice at locations used to post notices to unit 
employees.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
UCS argues that the new policy is not a change in its prior practice; that the policy 
is a nonmandatory, mission-related directive; that the ALJ erred in finding that UCS's 
imposition of the disciplinary component of the new policy violated the Act; and that the 
remedial order improperly requires UCS to pay employees the wages that they would 
have earned from outside employment. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision and order. 
FACTS 
UCS employs court officers in several different bargaining units defined by 
Judicial District and region. About 250 to 300 court officers are represented by CSEA 
in the Third through Eighth Judicial Districts and those who served in State-paid 
positions for UCS prior to April 1, 1977, as well as those who were once employed by 
various counties. The other court officers are represented by different employee 
organizations. The job description for all court officers states that they are responsible 
for maintaining order and providing security in courtrooms, court buildings and grounds. 
It states that they are peace officers, required to wear uniforms, and that they may be 
authorized to carry firearms, execute warrants, make arrests and coordinate the 
activities of other court security personnel. 
According to Lauren DeSole, UCS's Director of Human Resources, court officers 
are frequently asked to provide security services for private entities while off duty. In 
May 2004, two court officers of the Ninth Judicial District were shot,"one fatally, during 
1
 40 PERB fl4597 (2007). 
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off-duty employment as bouncers in a Queens nightclub. Newspaper accounts of the 
incident stated that the court officers broke up a fight in the club and evicted those 
involved. Soon after, some of the culprits returned and shot the officers. 
DeSole testified that the incident was very upsetting to UCS administrators, 
including its Chief Administrative Judge, who was then Jonathan Lippman, and was the 
impetus for UCS to curtail such off-duty activity. She testified that UCS wanted to 
prevent court officers from "putting [themselves] in harms way and then having some 
horrible incident [happen] that ha[s] an impact on the Court's public image, which 
affects our mission."2 According to DeSole, UCS was particularly concerned about 
adverse press coverage if court officers are involved in violent encounters during off-
duty employment in disreputable establishments. In that regard, DeSole noted that the 
nightclub in which the officers were shot was a "gentleman's club" and that it was not a 
"nice" place. The newspaper articles reported that the club was a "strip club." DeSole 
testified that UCS was also concerned about its potential liability stemming from the 
training that it provides court officers as peace officers and their use of UCS-issued 
equipment during off-duty employment.3 
UCS requested bargaining with several bargaining agents for court officers to 
negotiate a new off-duty employment policy. According to DeSole, among the subjects 
that UCS wanted to negotiate were limits on the number of hours an employee could 
work off-duty and restrictions on the use of UCS equipment during outside employment. 
2Tr. ,atp. 144. 
3
 DeSole testified the UCS issues bulletproof vests but that the officers purchase their 
own firearms. 
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After several meetings without agreement with CSEA, UCS issued the May 12, 
2005 policy at issue here. It distributed the new policy under a cover memo that stated: 
Following the tragic event last year involving two court 
officers who were working off-duty, we undertook an effort 
with our unions that represent peace officers to clarify and 
improve our off-duty employment policy. 
Attached is the product of that effort - an Off-Duty 
Employment Policy for Peace Officers and a new Off-Duty 
Security Employment Form. 
Although the cover memo suggests that all of the unions participated in the development 
of the new policy and form, CSEA did not agree to them. 
As relevant here, the new policy states:4 
All peace officers shall comply with the following 
regulations governing off-duty employment: 
* * * 
2. Off-duty employment to provide security at the following 
locations is strictly prohibited: 
a. a location where the primary business activity is the 
selling of alcohol for consumption on the premises, for 
example bars and taverns. Employment is allowed at 
locations where alcohol is sold for on premises 
consumption as long as this is not the primary business 
activity, for example security employment at hotels or 
stadiums hosting sporting events. 
* * * 
3. Off-duty Security Employment Form... 
a. Peace officers must submit an Off-Duty Security 
Employment Form to the Administrative Director of the 
4
 The omitted portions of the new policy are not contested by CSEA. See, ALJ Exhibit 
4. Thus, for example, CSEA does not object to the policy's blanket ban on outside 
employment where illegal activity is taking place or in locations owned or operated by 
, individuals with involvement in organized criminal enterprises. 
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Office of Court Administration and obtain approval for all 
off-duty security positions. No off-duty security position 
can be accepted without prior approval. The Administrator 
[sic] Director of the Office of Court Administration, in 
consultation with the appropriate Deputy Chief 
Administrative Judge, may disapprove off-duty employment 
not in compliance with the Rules of the Chief Judge or this 
procedure. The Administrative Director will respond within 
ten business days of receipt of the Off-Duty Security 
Employment Form. 
b. Every peace officer presently engaged in off-duty 
security employment must file an Off-Duty Security 
Employment Form with the Administrative Director of the 
Office of Court Administration within ten days of receipt of 
this directive. If disapproved, the peace officer must 
immediately terminate the off-duty employment. 
c. All approvals to work off-duty security employment 
expire on April 30th. A renewal application must be 
submitted to the Administrative Director for the Office of 
Court Administration by April 1st of each year. 
d. A determination by the Administrative Director may be 
appealed by petition to the Chief Administrative Judge or 
by application to the courts in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
4. Failure to comply with this procedure...shall result in 
disciplinary action. 
The new form, which was attached to the policy, requires the identification of the 
employee, including work address, the outside employer, including address and type of 
business, the title and duties of the position to be filled, and whether the employee will 
be required to carry a firearm.5 
The previous policy regarding off-duty employment of peace officers is set forth 
in the Rules of the Chief Judge, two versions of the Employee Handbook and the Court 
5
 The ALJ held that the requirement to use the new form did not violate the Act, and 
CSEA has not taken exception to that determination. 
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Officers Rules and Procedures Manual. Each prior articulation of the policy is 
substantially similar to the others, but different from the May 12, 2005 version. 
The Rules of the Chief Judge provide a code of ethics for non-judicial employees 
which, in relevant part, states that court employees "shall not engage in outside 
employment or business activities that interfere with the performance of their official 
duties or that create an actual or appearance of conflict with those duties."6 The 1988 
and 1999 Employee Handbooks also prohibit outside employment that will create a 
conflict of interests or interfere with the performance of official duties. The Handbooks 
further provide that employees "should report and discuss any outside employment and 
relevant restrictions" with their local administrators. 
1
 The December 2003 Court Officers Rules and Procedures Manual also prohibits 
any outside employment that creates a conflict of interests or interferes with the 
performance of a court officer's duties. It too states that court officers "should report 
and discuss any outside employment and its relevant restrictions" with local 
administrators. In contrast, the Rules and Procedures Manual expressly requires prior 
approval for outside public sector employment. 
Other provisions of the Rules and Procedures Manual, while not directly related 
to outside employment, prohibit the performance of "any service for personal gain or the 
private interest of another party which interferes with the proper performance of duty" 
and the knowing association with "any person or organization reasonably believed to be 
engaged in, likely to engage in or having engaged in criminal activities" or engaging in 
"any behavior which is prejudicial to the good order, efficiency or discipline of [UCS]." 
6
 See, 22 NYCRR §50.1 (111) (A). 
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The Rules and Procedures Manual also states that court officers "must always be 
mindful that they are the visible representatives of the Unified Court System and that 
their appearance and conduct has a direct effect on how the court system is perceived." 
DeSole testified that until the May 2005 policy was issued, the outside 
employment rules were administered at the local level.7 Thus, for example, in February 
2002, Judge Ann Pfau, then the new Administrative Judge for the Second Judicial 
District, issued a memorandum to employees under her administration regarding UCS 
policy on outside employment, stating: "As a general rule, our employees are permitted 
to hold jobs outside their court employment, provided that there is no conflict of either 
time or interest between the court job and outside job." The memo explained: 
This means that the.outside employment must not be 
performed during court working hours, and that the duties 
and responsibilities of the outside job must not be 
incompatible with the proper performance of the court job, 
both in actuality and in appearance. 
Although the 1988 and 1999 Employee Handbooks state that employees "should report 
and discuss any outside employment and its relevant restrictions" with the appropriate 
person in their administrative office [emphasis added], Judge Pfau's 2002 memo states: 
"As set forth in the Employee Handbook, court employees are obligated to report and 
discuss any outside employment and its relevant restrictions with court administrators to 
ensure that there are no conflicts with court employment" [emphasis added]. The 
memo further states: "In beginning my new role, I would like to take an overall look at 
the outside employment of all court employees to determine if any conflicts exist." 
Finally, the memo states that employees must "send directly to my attention all 
7
 CSEA did not object to the centralization of the off-duty employment policy. 
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instances of outside employment that you engage in. If I see there may be a conflict, I 
will speak with you personally to determine how best that conflict may be resolved." 
DeSole testified that the more restrictive rules for outside employment for employees in 
the Second Judicial District, including the review of existing outside employment, were 
attributable to Judge Pfau's belief that her predecessor in that district had not effectively 
administered UCS's policy. 
Colin R. Farley, a court officer employed by UCS since 1993, testified that in 
February 2002, he took outside employment for three weeks performing security at a 
night club located in a Holiday Inn while he was a court officer for the Fourth Judicial 
District - a District where CSEA represents court officers. Farley testified that "the rules 
and procedure" required him to get approval for his outside employment to ensure that 
there was no "conflict." However, it was not until after he accepted the job that he 
notified his immediate supervisor, Sergeant Charvoneau, whose only inquiry was 
whether he would be armed. Farley responded that he would not be armed, and 
Charvoneau directed him to notify a superior officer named McCartney, whose rank at 
that time is not specified on the record. In McCartney's absence, Farley next spoke 
with another senior officer, Levers, whose rank at that time is also not specified on the 
record. Levers advised Farley that he had either spoken to or would speak to 
McCartney on his behalf. Farley testified that McCartney, upon speaking with Levers, 
orally approved his outside employment. Three weeks later, after Farley's outside 
employment ended, McCartney told him that, in the future, he would have to fill out a 
form to report outside security work in any club. 
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DISCUSSION 
A public employer violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally altering a non-
contractual practice concerning mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions of 
employment for represented employees where the practice "was unequivocal and was 
continued uninterrupted for a period of time under the circumstances to create a 
reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the [practice] would 
continue."8 Generally, work rules that restrict represented employees' activities while 
off duty, including outside employment, are mandatorily negotiable terms and 
conditions of employment.9 However, a new work rule that serves an objectively 
demonstrable need in furtherance of the employer's mission may not be mandatorily 
negotiable where the employer's interests in a particular mission-related rule outweigh 
the impact that the change has on the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment.10 The employer bears the burden of proof to establish that its mission-
related purpose for the change is sufficient, on balance, to defeat its bargaining 
obligations.11 That a work rule may have some relationship to an employer's mission 
8
 Matter of Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
61 AD3d 1231, 1233, 42 PERB 1J7004, at 7008 (3d Dept 2009) citing Chenango Forks 
Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB 1J3012 (2007). 
9
 See Village ofCatskill, 43 PERB 1J3001 (2010); New York City Transit Auth, 42 PERB 
U3012 (2009) (appeal pending); City of Albany, 42 PERB P005 (2009); Hewlett-
Woodmere Union Free Sch Dist, 38 PERB P006 (2005); Ulster County Sheriff, 27 
PERB 1J3028 (1994); City of Buffalo (Police Dept), 23 PERB 1J3050 (1990); Local 589, 
IntlAssn of Fire Fighters, 16 PERB 1J3030 (1983). 
10
 Id. See also, Lippman v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 296 AD2d 199, 35 
PERB U7014 (3d Dept 2005); New York State Thruway Auth, 21 PERB 1J3058 (1988); 
County of Montgomery, 18 PERB 1J3077 (1985). 
11
 See, City of Albany, supra note 9. 
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does not permit the employer to act unilaterally in any manner it deems appropriate.12 
A work rule that is directed to an employers' mission may not be mandatorily negotiable 
only to the extent that it does not "significantly or unnecessarily intrude on the protected 
interests of bargaining unit employees."13 
Applying those standards here, we find that UCS's May 12, 2005 off-duty 
employment policy is, as written and implemented, a material change from the prior 
policy. 
First, unlike the new off-duty employment policy, none of the previous versions 
contains a blanket prohibition on outside employment in locations where the primary 
business activity is the selling of alcohol for consumption on the premises. Rather, 
each of the prior versions states only that employees may not engage in off-duty 
employment that creates a conflict of interests, real or apparent, or which interferes with 
the performance of official duties. 
Farley's testimony shows that he was permitted to take outside employment 
providing security in a nightclub where the primary business was the legal sale and 
consumption of alcohol, establishing that such work was not treated as a conflict of 
interests under the prior policy. Indeed, Carol Hamm, Deputy Inspector General in 
UCS's Inspector General's Office, testified that she has investigated reports of off-duty 
employment alleged to constitute conflicts of interests under the prior policy. She 
illustrated such employment as a court officer in a surrogate's court who was gathering 
documents for private companies that were doing work before the surrogate's court and 
12
 Id., at 3007. 
13
 Id. 
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another working as a process server. She had no examples of impermissible off-duty 
employment in legally operated bars and taverns, and she had no knowledge of a 
CSEA represented court officer being disciplined for working in such establishments.14 
Although DeSole testified that UCS would never have permitted employees to 
work in locations where the primary business is the legal sale and consumption of 
alcohol, she had no direct role in approving, much less considering the appropriateness 
of such work under the prior policy, which was administered at the local level. Her 
testimony appears to be based on her construction of the prior policy rather than her 
experience with its implementation, and it does not outweigh Farley's testimony 
regarding his personal experience under the prior policy. Moreover, like Hamm, DeSole 
was unable to offer specific examples where CSEA represented employees were told 
that they could not work in such places or disciplined for doing so. 
In State of New York (Dept of Taxation and Finance),'15 the Board held that an 
employer's general policy requiring professional attire did not permit it to unilaterally 
impose a more restrictive ban on wearing specific clothing where employees had never 
been disciplined for wearing such clothing before. Likewise, UCS's general policy 
barring outside employment where there is a conflict of interests, real or apparent, or 
which interferes with the performance of official duties, does not permit it to unilaterally 
14
 The ALJ declined to accept into evidence Respondent's Exhibit 10, which is a 
selection of disciplinary charges brought against employees for misconduct. The 
charges were for various forms of time and attendance abuse. During some of the 
unauthorized absences, employees were engaged in outside employment. However, 
none of the charges was based on the outside employment, and none concerned work 
in bars or taverns. We agree with the ALJ's conclusion that the documents are not 
relevant to UCS's claim that the new policy was not a change. 
1530PERBP028(1997). 
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place a more restrictive ban on all off-duty employment in establishments where the legal 
sale and consumption of alcohol is the primary activity where, as Farley's testimony 
shows, such employment was permitted before the implementation of the new policy. 
Second, although the Rules and Procedures Manual expressly requires pre-
approval for outside public sector employment, each of the prior versions of the policy 
regarding outside private sector employment states only that such employment "should" 
be reported and discussed with administrative officials. In contrast to the new policy, 
none speaks of prior approval or annual re-approval for outside employment of any kind 
in privately owned and operated establishments. While Farley's testimony shows that 
prior notice was required, it also shows that such notice enabled UCS administrators to 
consider the work to ensure that there was no conflict of interests, and, as appropriate, 
to place restrictions on his outside employment after discussing it with him. However, 
an employee's duty to notify UCS of his or her outside employment does not establish 
that prior approval was required. Although DeSole testified that court officers have 
always been required to obtain pre-approval for any outside employment, there is again 
no record basis for her understanding because the prior policy was administered at the 
local level. Indeed, paragraph 3(b) of the new policy requires those who presently hold 
outside employment to seek approval of that work. Thus, the new policy itself implicitly 
recognizes that current outside employment by court officers was not always pre-
approved by UCS. 
Third, none of the prior versions of the off-duty employment policy contains a 
mandated disciplinary component for failing to notify UCS of outside employment or for 
engaging in inappropriate outside employment, and there is no evidence of anyone 
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having been disciplined for failing to give UCS prior notice of or engaging in any 
particular outside employment. In that regard, Hamm testified that when outside 
employment was found to present a conflict of interests, UCS generally required the 
employee to simply discontinue it, as does paragraph 3(b) of the new policy.16 
Likewise, Judge Pfau's construction of the prior policy as articulated in her 2002 memo 
shows that there was no mandated disciplinary component for engaging in work that 
she disapproved of. Rather, employees were told: "If I see there may be a conflict, I will 
speak with you personally to determine how best that conflict may be resolved." 
UCS argues that the disciplinary component of the new policy does not 
constitute a change. It emphasizes that "misconduct" has always warranted discipline 
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement and that failure to abide by the 
previous off-duty employment policy constituted "misconduct." However, the argument 
assumes that under the prior policy an employee engaged in "misconduct" by taking 
outside employment where the legal sale and consumption of alcohol is the primary 
business or by failing to obtain pre-approval and re-approval for outside employment. 
There is, as discussed above, no evidence to support that proposition. 
UCS also argues that the new policy does not mandate disciplinary action. It 
contends that the policy does not impair the discretion that UCS's administrators have 
in deciding whether to impose such action. However, the new policy plainly states that 
failure to abide by its rules and restrictions "shall result in disciplinary action" [emphasis 
added]. It does not say "may" result in disciplinary action. To whatever extent UCS has 
16
 Presumably, if the employee refused to discontinue the employment he or she would 
be subject to discipline. 
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discretion whether to take disciplinary action under the new policy, it is inconsistent with 
the policy's unambiguous wording. 
Finally, UCS argues that CSEA withdrew any objection to the mandated disciplinary 
component of the new policy. It emphasizes the ALJ's statement in her decision that 
CSEA only objected to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the new policy. However, in its proper 
context, the record shows that CSEA withdrew its objections to the restrictions on the other 
activities.17 It did not withdraw its objection to the disciplinary component associated with 
the restrictions on the activities about which it had not withdrawn its objections. 
Accordingly, the record fully supports the ALJ's conclusion that the new policy 
changed the previous policy by prohibiting all outside employment in establishments 
where the legal sale and consumption of alcohol is the primary business, by requiring 
pre-approval, rather than prior notice, of outside employment, and by requiring annual 
re-approval of all such employment, all subject to a new mandatory disciplinary 
component. The new policy affects work rules and contains a disciplinary aspect, both 
of which are mandatory topics of bargaining. Because of its unequivocal nature, 
uninterrupted duration and the circumstances under which it was applied, UCS's prior 
policy was a past practice cognizable under the Act.18 Therefore, UCS violated §209-
a.1(d) by implementing those aspects of its new off-duty employment policy, unless 
there is merit to its defense that the changes had a mission-related purpose that 
defeated its statutory bargaining obligations. 
17
 See, ALJ Exhibit 4; Tr., at pp. 132-134. 
18
 See Matter of Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations 
Bd and Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, supra note 8. 
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UCS argues that its mission, vis-a-vis the court officers, is "to provide effective 
and impartial justice in a secure and safe setting with a professional uniformed force 
that is sensitive to the needs of the court and the public."19 It contends that its new 
policy serves that mission "by ensuring that its court officers are perceived as law 
abiding, responsible individuals who exercise good judgment."20 
Although the new policy prohibits all off-duty employment in bars and taverns 
where the primary business is the sale and consumption of alcohol, DeSole testified 
that it was not intended to prohibit court officers from tending bar in such 
establishments. She explained that bartending "does not put them in harm's way in the 
same way that working as security does."21 Her testimony suggests that the new 
restrictions, while not so articulated in the policy, are limited to court officers performing 
off-duty security functions. Characterizing the work of off-duty security in bars and 
taverns.as an exercise of poor judgment, DeSole testified that the public's confidence in 
the security functions that court officers provide in court is impaired when people read 
press accounts of court officers involved in such off-duty work. She testified that such 
off-duty employment reflects poorly on the courts. 
Having considered UCS's argument and DeSole's testimony, we are not 
persuaded that the new policy so advances UCS's mission as to outweigh the employees' 
interests in earning extra income while off-duty by working in bars and taverns where the 
legal sale and consumption of alcohol is the primary business, even if the new policy were 
19
 UCS's brief at p. 23. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Tr., at p. 129. 
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confined to security services in those establishments. Indeed, we are not persuaded that 
working off-duty in such establishments, whether as a bartender, security person or in 
some other lawful capacity reflects poor judgment. There is, for example no reason to 
conclude that the officers exercised poor judgment by taking outside employment in the 
Queens nightclub. Although we might agree that strip-clubs are not nice places, as 
DeSole testified, we cannot, on this record, conclude that court officers' mere employment 
in such establishments impairs UCS's ability to rely on them to fulfill its mission while they 
are on-duty. That press coverage of tragic events such as that which occurred in the 
Queens nightclub may prove embarrassing to UCS administrators does not outweigh the 
employees' right to earn extra money engaging in off-duty security. We do not see how 
UCS would be less embarrassed if they were working as bartenders in such 
establishments, which, according to DeSole, is not prohibited by the new policy. Finally, 
UCS's potential liability for court officers' off-duty conduct owing to its training of the 
officers is an economic factor that does not affect the duty to negotiate.22 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the new policy is mandatorily 
negotiable. Because there is no dispute that it was unilaterally implemented, we affirm 
the ALJ's conclusion that UCS violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
We now address UCS's exceptions regarding the ALJ's remedial order. 
Under §205.5(d) of the Act, PERB has broad remedial authority. It states that 
PERB is authorized "to issue a decision and order directing an offending party to cease 
and desist from any improper practice, and to take such affirmative action as will 
effectuate the policies of this article (but not to assess exemplary damages), including but 
22
 See, Village of Catskill and Ulster County Sheriff, supra. 
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not limited to the reinstatement of employees with or without back pay." It expressly 
characterizes PERB's remedial power as the "authority to make employees whole for the 
loss of pay and/or benefits."23 As the Board stated in International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Local 182 (Hoke),24 "[m]ake-whole relief is intended to place aggrieved parties 
in the position they would have been in had the statutory improper practice not been 
committed."25 Record evidence of the extent of any harm caused by an improper practice 
is not a prerequisite to a make-whole order.26 Who is owed how much are questions 
properly addressed by the parties in negotiations or in compliance proceedings.27 
UCS argues that we should not order it to compensate court officers for income 
they would have earned in bars and taverns under the prior policy because they would 
not have been authorized to take such jobs. However, based on the foregoing, we 
have found that the prior policy did not prohibit all such outside work. 
UCS also argues that it should not be required to compensate court officers for 
wages that they would have earned from a private employer. However, the remedy that 
23
 See, e.g., Matter of Uniondale Union Free Sch Distv Newman, 167 AD2d 475, 23 
PERB 1J7022 (2d Dept 1990); Matter of State of New York, Governor's OffofEmpI 
Relations v Public Empl Relations Bd, 116 AD2d 827 (3d Dept 1986); Matter of City of 
Poughkeepsie v Newman, 95 AD2d 101 (3d Dept 1983), appeal dismissed 60 NY2d 
859 (1983), Iv denied 62 NY2d 602 (1984); Matter of Public Empl Fedn v Public Empl 
Relations Bd, 93 AD2d 910 (3d Dept 1983); Matter of City of Albany v Helsby, 56 AD2d 
976 (3d Dept 1977); Matter of City of Albany v Helsby, 29 NY2d 433 (1972). 
24
 30 PERB 1J3005 (1997) at 3013. 
25
 See also, State of New York (Semowich), 26 PERB P026 (1993); Burnt HiJIs-
Ballston Lake Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB 1J3066 (1992). 
26
 See, e.g., County of Erie, 30 PERB Tf3017 (1997). 
27
 See, e.g., City of Troy, 28 PERB 1J3027 (1995); County of Broome, 22 PERB 113019 
(1989). 
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the ALJ issued here places the affected employees in the same position that they would 
have been in had UCS not violated the Act, and it is virtually identical to the remedial 
orders we have issued in other cases involving unlawful restrictions on outside 
employment. We see no reason why we should depart from those precedents here. 
By reason of the foregoing, UCS's exceptions are denied, and the decision and 
order of the ALJ are affirmed.28 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that UCS: 
1. immediately rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of its May 
12, 2005 policy on outside employment for court officers in the State Judiciary 
Negotiating Unit represented by CSEA, with the exception of the requirement of the 
form to be filled out by the employee; 
2. Make whole court officers for any loss of pay or benefits resulting from the 
May 12, 2005 policy, with interest at the maximum legal rate and including any 
imposition of discipline thereunder; and 
3. sign and post notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used to 
post written notices of information to employees in the unit represented by CSEA. 
DATED: March 17,2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite', Member 
'. C ^ -
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
Chairman Jerome Lefkowitz and Deputy Chair William A. Herbert took no part. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York - Unified Court System in the 
unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, that the Unified Court System: 
1. Will immediately rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of its May 12, 2005 policy on outside employment 
for court officers in the State Judiciary Negotiating Unit represented 
by CSEA, with the exception of the requirement of the form to be 
filled out by the employee; 
2. Will make whole court officers for any loss of pay or benefits 
resulting from the May 12, 2005 policy, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate and including any imposition of discipline 
thereunder. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
State of New York - Unified Court System 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-28124 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
RONALD GRASSEL, pro se 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (RUSSELL J. PLATZEK of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Ronald Grassel (Grassel) to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by Grassel against the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District) alleging that the District violated §§209-a. 1 (a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it issued disciplinary 
charges against him, and suspended him, in December 2007 pursuant to Education 
Law §3020-a. 
Following our decision in Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (Grasself affirming the dismissal of an earlier related charge, Case No. 
U-27502, the ALJ requested the parties to identify any triable issues of fact that may 
1
 41 PERB 1J3024 (2008). 
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require a hearing based upon a June 13, 2008 offer of proof by Grassel during the 
processing of the amended charge. 
In response to the ALJ's request, Grassel submitted a letter demanding a hearing 
without identifying any disputed facts and without supplementing his prior offer of proof. 
The District responded by moving to dismiss the amended charge. Subsequently, 
Grassel submitted to the ALJ transcript excerpts from the pending Education Law 
§3020-a disciplinary hearing in support of his charge. 
On July 15, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the amended charge 
concluding that Grassel's allegations, which if proven, are insufficient to establish a 
prima facie case of improper motivation under the Act.2 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Grassel asserts that the ALJ erred in dismissing his amended 
charge without a full hearing, and erred in requesting the parties to identify triable issues 
of fact. In addition, Grassel seeks review of various procedural rulings, including the 
denial of his motions for the disqualification of the ALJ, particularization of the District's 
answer, and for issuance of subpoenas. Finally, Grassel renews his request that the 
ALJ be disqualified. The District supports the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we grant Grassel's exceptions, in part, but affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing the 
amended charge. 
242PERB1J4541 (2009). 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
o 
In his amended charge, Grassel alleges that the District violated §§209-a. 1 (a) 
and (c) of the Act when it issued Education Law §3020-a disciplinary charges against 
him On December 17, 2007, and suspended him, after it had withdrawn prior disciplinary 
charges "with prejudice," on March 1, 2007. 
Among the documents attached to the charge are the Education Law §3020-a 
disciplinary charges, dated December 17, 2007, issued by the principal of the Harry Van 
Arsdale High School. The disciplinary charges allege that Grassel failed to report for a 
scheduled medical evaluation on June 29, 2007 and that he refused a directive to be 
examined by District medical personnel on August 3, 2007. In addition, attached to the 
charge are an excerpt from the District's medical records, dated September 25, 1991, a 
June 16, 1997 counseling memorandum to Grassel about his conduct in the principal's 
i 
office on June 13, 1997, and the transcript of a March 1, 2007 hearing during which the 
District withdrew prior disciplinary charges against him. 
Following two deficiency notices from the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director), Grassel amended his charge to allege that the 
December 2007 disciplinary charges and suspension were in retaliation for him filing a 
grievance on June 13, 1997, and contesting earlier disciplinary charges that had been 
withdrawn by the District on March 1, 2007.3 The District filed an answer to the 
amended charge. 
3
 ALJ Exhibit 5,1ffl3(a) and (b). 
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At a pre-hearing conference on March 27, 2008, Grassel filed a "Procedural 
Objection" alleging that the District's answer is untimely. In addition he submitted a 
request for issuance of multiple subpoenas. 
By letter dated April 7, 2008, the ALJ concluded that the District's answer is timely 
and directed Grassel to renew his subpoena request to the ALJ assigned to conduct a 
hearing. On April 11, 2008, Grassel filed a modified subpoena request. 
Preceding the scheduled hearing on June 13, 2008, the ALJ conducted an off-the-
record discussion with the parties with respect to the allegations of the amended charge 
and with respect to certain exhibits. Based upon those discussions, at the 
commencement of the hearing, the ALJ placed on the record the following clarification of 
the amended charge: 
The charge alleges that on March 1, 2007 the Board of 
Education withdraw [sic] a charge that had been brought 
against Mr. Grassel and thereafter on December 17th, 18th 
and 19th, 2007 the Board of Education revoked the 
withdrawal of the charges and suspended him without pay. 
The reason why the charge was reinstated was because he 
previously had contested the 3020-A [sic] charges that had 
been brought against him.4 
Thereafter, the ALJ requested Grassel to set forth, on the record, any additional 
factual bases for his amended charge. In response, Grassel stated that the District violated 
the stipulation withdrawing the prior charges, and that it issued the new disciplinary charges 
in retaliation for his resistance to the earlier disciplinary charges, and because he had filed 
grievances.5 During a colloquy, the ALJ noted that the only specific grievance identified in 
4
 Transcript, pp. 6-7. 
5
 Transcript, pp. 13-25. 
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the amended charge is a June 13, 1997 grievance.6 In response, Grassel did not identify 
any other specific grievances he had filed but referenced handwritten notes, dated 
September 25, 1991, from the District's medical records, mentioning other grievances.7 
Finally, Grassel stated that his grievances led to threats against him, a heart attack, and the 
refusal of the school to allow him to receive medical care.8 
On July 3, 2008, the Board denied a motion by Grassel for leave to file exceptions, 
pursuant to §212.4(g) of the Rules, in which he alleged purported misconduct by the ALJ 
during the off-the-record discussions on June 13, 2008. At that time, we did not address 
Grassel's claim that the ALJ should be disqualified because the issue was then pending 
before the ALJ.9 
On August 27, 2008, the ALJ issued a letter decision .setting forth a series of 
rulings in response to procedural issues raised by the parties.10 The ALJ denied 
Grassel's disqualification motion concluding that Grassel had failed to demonstrate 
personal bias or improper conduct by the ALJ. In addition, the ALJ denied Grassel's 
motion for particularization and his request for subpoenas because he failed to comply 
with the requirements of the Rules. The ALJ also denied the District's motion to dismiss 
the amended charge, rejecting its claim that PERB lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 
6
 Transcript, p. 20. 
7
 Transcript, pp. 21-24. 
8
 Transcript, pp. 22, 25. The September 25, 1991 medical record excerpt, attached to 
the original charge, states that Grassel engaged in erratic behavior, irrational behavior, 
and filed 2 or 3 grievances weekly. ALJ Exhibit 1. 
9
 41 PERB 1J3016 (2008). 
10
 41 PERB1J3031 (2008). 
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hear Grassel's amended charge. At the conclusion of his letter decision, the ALJ stated 
that he would hold the amended charge in abeyance pending the Board's decision on 
the exceptions filed by Grassel to the dismissal of an earlier related charge, Case No. 
U-27502. 
On September 24, 2008, we issued our decision in Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (Grassel)u affirming the dismissal of Grassel's 
earlier charge on the grounds that he had failed to prove that the District's delay in 
reinstating him in 2007 was improperly motivated under the Act. 
In reaching our decision, we concluded that his January 1997 protected activity 
was too remote to demonstrate a causal connection with the delay in reinstating him in 
2007. Although Grassel referenced a 1997 grievance in his exceptions, that grievance 
was not in the record, and we therefore were unable to determine its probative value. 
In our decision, we rejected Grassel's argument that the alleged failure of the 
District to comply with the terms of the March 1, 2007 stipulation constituted proof of 
improper motivation, stating 
that although the District stipulated that it was withdrawing 
the pending disciplinary charges "with prejudice," the 
colloquy between counsel makes clear that the stipulation 
was limited to the District agreeing not to bring future 
disciplinary charges based on the directives given to Grassel 
in 1997 and 1998 and the disciplinary issues resolved by the 
arbitration panel. The stipulation did not bar the District from 
filing future disciplinary charges premised on other alleged 
conduct by Grassel or from following its administrative 
practices with respect to reinstatements.12 
11
 Supra note 1. 
12
 Supra note 1, 41 PERB P024, at pp. 3112-3113. 
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Following our decision, the ALJ sent a letter, dated April 15, 2009, to the parties 
requesting they submit their respective positions as to whether there are triable issues 
of fact remaining in the present case based upon the Board's decision and Grassel's 
June 13, 2008 offer of proof. In response, Grassel submitted a letter asserting that a 
hearing was necessary but did not identify any additional facts he intended to prove if a 
hearing were held. The District renewed its motion to dismiss the amended charge. 
In response to the District's motion, Grassel submitted to the ALJ transcript 
excerpts from the hearing being conducted with respect to the disciplinary charges 
referenced in the amended charge. According to Grassel, the transcript excerpts 
include an inconsistency with the District's description, in its motion to dismiss, of the 
underlying facts that support the disciplinary charges. 
Following a review of the parties' submissions, and Grassel's prior offer of proof, 
the ALJ dismissed the amended charge without a hearing concluding that our prior 
decision is dispositive. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with Grassel's exceptions challenging the ALJ's procedural rulings 
denying his motion for disqualification, his motion for particularization of the District's 
answer, and his application for the issuance of multiple subpoenas.13 
1. Motion for Recusal 
Pursuant to §212.4 of the Rules, a party can make a motion to an ALJ seeking 
his or her recusal. In the present case, Grassel seeks the ALJ's disqualification based 
13
 Grassel excepts to the Board's prior decisions denying him leave to file exceptions. 
We deny those exceptions because our prior decisions are not reviewable under §213.2 
of the Rules. 
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upon purported pre-hearing statements made by the ALJ to the parties during off-the-
record discussions on June 13, 2008 and delays by the ALJ in ruling on his application 
for issuance of subpoenas. In his decision denying the motion, the ALJ ruled that 
Grassel had failed to set forth facts that demonstrate personal bias or facts establishing 
that the ALJ is incapable of making a fair and impartial decision on the merits. 
Grassel asserts in his exceptions that the ALJ erred in denying the motion for 
disqualification. In addition, he claims that the ALJ's dismissal of the charge without 
holding a hearing and the ALJ's alleged failure to set forth a detailed factual analysis of 
the record constitute additional grounds for disqualification. 
Following our review of the record, we reaffirm our prior determination that the 
ALJ's purported pre-hearing statements, and the delay in ruling on the request for 
subpoenas, do not constitute bases for disqualification.14 Efforts to clarify the 
allegations of a charge or an answer are part of an ALJ's quasi-judicial responsibilities. 
Furthermore, the delay in ruling upon Grassel's subpoena requests does not 
demonstrate bias by the ALJ. 
Contrary to Grassel's argument, the ALJ's reference to Judiciary Law §14 in 
denying the motion for disqualification is not reversible error. The disqualification 
standards for ALJs are analogous to those applicable to members of the judiciary. 
Finally, we reject Grassel's claim that the ALJ demonstrated bias because he 
dismissed the charge without holding a hearing and without setting forth a proper 
analysis of the record. The dismissal of the amended charge, premised upon the 
pleadings, offers of proof, and prior precedent between the parties, is well within the 
14
 Supra note 10. 
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ALJ's discretion and does not constitute objective evidence that the ALJ favors a 
particular party or is incapable of rendering an impartial determination.15 
2. Motion for Particularization 
The ALJ denied Grassel's motion for particularization, pursuant to §204.3 of the 
Rules, because the motion does not seek amplification of the factual allegations that 
form the basis for the District's affirmative defenses. Following a review of the record, 
we affirm the ALJ's ruling denying Grassel's motion because it does not seek 
particularization of the affirmative defenses set forth in the District's answer. 
3. Application for Subpoenas 
Grassel filed a pre-hearing application for the issuance of 14 subpoenas to be 
served upon various District administrators including the District's Superintendent. In 
addition, he sought issuance of a subpoena duces tecum seeking "any other records, 
e-mails, photographs, personnel files, papers or objects" relating to the disciplinary 
charges and suspension and the hearing on his amended charge. As a result of our 
review of the full record, we reaffirm our earlier conclusion that Grassel's subpoena 
requests are overbroad and vexatious.16 In addition, we affirm the ALJ's ruling that the 
request for 14 subpoenas ad testificum did not comply with §211.3 of the Rules by 
setting forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the relevancy of the testimony Grassel seeks 
to adduce. 
15
 Similarly, we are not persuaded by Grassel's argument that the ALJ engaged in 
improper conduct by informally advising the District's counsel on April 30, 2009 that his 
request for an extension of time was granted until May 1, 2009. Such brief de minimis 
communications over scheduling do not constitute misconduct by an ALJ. 
16
 Supra note 5, 41 PERB 1J3031 (2008). 
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We also reject Grassel's exceptions challenging the ALJ's reliance upon 
statements he made on June 13, 2008 at the commencement of the hearing. Similarly, 
we deny his challenge to the ALJ's April 15, 2009 request to the parties for statements 
as to whether there are any remaining triable issues of fact, based upon our decision in 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel).17 
4. The Offers of Proof 
During the processing of a charge or petition, an ALJ has the discretion to 
request an offer of proof from a party aimed at clarifying the alleged facts in support of a 
claim or defense.18 An offer of proof can aid in the narrowing of factual issues in 
dispute, and clarify for the ALJ whether a hearing is necessary. 
On June 13, 2008, in response to the ALJ's request to clarify the amended 
charge, Grassel stated that the December, 2007 disciplinary charges were in retaliation 
for his contesting the prior disciplinary charges that had been withdrawn on March 1, 
2007, and for filing grievances. The grievances mentioned during the colloquy between 
the ALJ and Grassel are a June 13, 1997 grievance, which he pled in the amended 
charge, and other unspecified grievances referenced in the September 25, 1991 
handwritten District medical notes attached to his original pleading. In addition, he 
asserted that his grievances led to threats, a heart attack, and a denial of medical care. 
In his exceptions, Grassel objects to the ALJ's treatment of his June 13, 2008 
statements as an offer of proof, and notes that his statements were not under oath. In 
17
 Supra note 1. 
18
 See, Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB P023 (2009); Roswell 
Park Cancer Institute, 34 PERB 1J3040 (2001). 
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addition, he claims that he was not afforded a sufficient opportunity to describe the factual 
predicate for his amended charge at the June 13, 2008 hearing. 
The ALJ's request to Grassel to articulate the facts that form the basis for his 
amended charge constitutes a request for an offer of proof. It is reasonable for an ALJ 
to expect a charging party, alleging a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c), to be able to 
identify the facts that he or she asserts supports a claim of improper motivation under 
the Act. A response to such a request must include alleged facts but it does not have to 
be in the form of a sworn statement. 
In the present case, the record establishes that Grassel responded to the ALJ's 
request with legal arguments and certain alleged facts. Although Grassel claims that 
the ALJ did not permit him a full opportunity to identify the factual bases for his 
amended charge, we note that in subsequent multiple filings, Grassel has not identified 
any other alleged facts that underlie his charge. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's reliance 
upon Grassel's June 13, 2008 offer of proof in dismissing the amended charge. 
Similarly, we deny Grassel's exception to the ALJ's April 15, 2009 request to the 
parties to identify any triable issues following our 2008 decision.19 In that decision, we 
affirmed the dismissal of the earlier charge holding that Grassel had failed to prove a 
causal relationship between his January 17, 1997 memorandum and the District's delay in 
reinstating him following the March 1, 2007 withdrawal. In reaching our decision, we 
concluded that his January 1997 protected activity was too remote in time to demonstrate 
a causal connection. Although Grassel had referenced a 1997 grievance in his 
J 
19
 Supra note 1. 
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exceptions, that grievance was not in the record, and we therefore were unable to 
determine its probative value. 
Based upon the undisputed interrelationship between the allegations examined 
by the Board in the earlier case and Grassel's allegations in the amended charge, we 
conclude that the ALJ's April 15, 2009 request was well within the discretion granted to 
an ALJ in the processing of a charge. The ALJ's request provided Grassel with an 
additional opportunity to identify alleged facts that he believed demonstrate a causal 
relationship between his June 1997 grievance and earlier grievances, and the 
December 2007 disciplinary charges and suspension. Therefore, we deny Grassel's 
exception to the ALJ's request for a supplemental offer of proof. 
However, we grant the exception that challenges the ALJ's failure to consider the 
disciplinary hearing transcript excerpts submitted by Grassel. The ALJ did not consider 
the transcript excerpts on the grounds it does not constitute newly discovered 
evidence.20 We construe Grassel's submission of the excerpts as his attempt to 
establish that there are alleged facts in dispute. Therefore, we will examine the content 
of those transcripts as a part of our determination of the remaining exceptions to the 
ALJ's decision dismissing the amended charge. 
5. The Dismissal of the Amended Charge 
In his exceptions, Grassel asserts that the ALJ misconstrued the scope of 
protected activity alleged in the amended charge, treated our earlier decision as 
dispositive, and dismissed the amended charge without a hearing. 
; 
Supra note 2, 42 PERB 1J4541 at 4648, note 4. 
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As part of our consideration of his exceptions, we accept the truth of the 
allegations in the amended charge, as clarified by Grassel, granting all reasonable 
inferences to the facts alleged by him in support of his amended charge.21 
On June 13, 2008, the charge was clarified by the ALJ to include an allegation 
that the December 2007 disciplinary charges are in retaliation for Grassel's contesting 
the earlier disciplinary charges that were withdrawn on March 1, 2007. In addition, 
during his offer of proof, Grassel made explicit reference to the 1991 medical records 
that mention his earlier grievances. We, therefore, reverse the ALJ's finding that 
Grassel's 1997 grievance is the only protected activity alleged in the amended charge. 
However, granting all reasonable inferences to the facts alleged in the amended 
charge, and the content of Grassel's offers of proof, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the 
amended charge without a hearing. 
In Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(Grassel),22 we held that the ten years between the protected activity in January 1997 
and the District's alleged retaliatory employment action in 2007, was too long a period to 
create an inference of unlawful motivation under the Act. In addition, we found that the 
March 1, 2007 stipulation did not bar the District from pursuing "future disciplinary 
charges premised on other alleged conduct by Grassel."23 
In the present case, we conclude that Grassel has failed to allege sufficient facts, 
which, if proven, would create an inference that the December 17, 2007 disciplinary 
21
 Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., supra note 18. 
22
 Supra note 1. 
23
 Supra note 1, 41 PERB 1J3024 at 3113. 
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charges and suspension are improperly motivated by his grievances in 1991 and 1997. 
Although there is a relatively low initial evidentiary threshold for establishing a prima 
facie case of improper motivation under the Act,24 we find that Grassel alleged no facts 
that might reasonably demonstrate a causal relationship between his decade-old 
protected activities and the District's disciplinary action resulting from his alleged 
misconduct in June and August 2007. 
As in his earlier related case, the grievances referenced by Grassel are not in the 
record, and he fails to state how the substance of those grievances is probative of the 
issue of causation. Similarly, Grassel has not explained in his offers of proof how the 
references to his irrational and erratic behavior in the District's 1991 medical record 
create an inference that the District is improperly motivated 16 years later. 
Upon our review of the disciplinary hearing transcript excerpts, we find nothing 
that would support a finding of improper motivation by the District. The purported 
inconsistent statements by the District's attorneys, premised upon the transcripts, do not 
support an inference of improper motivation under the facts and circumstances of the 
present case. 
Finally, we find nothing in the record to indicate that Grassel, at a hearing, would 
present evidence establishing an inference that the current disciplinary charges and 
suspension are in retaliation for him contesting the earlier disciplinary charges. As we 
found in our prior decision, the stipulation resolving the prior disciplinary charges does 
not preclude the District from pursuing future disciplinary charges against Grassel for 
24
 United Fedn of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB H3007 (2008), 
confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 41 PERB 1J7007 (Sup 
Ct New York County 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB fl7008 (1s t Dept 2009). 
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other conduct. The December 17, 2007 disciplinary charges allege specific acts of 
misconduct in June and August 2007, and Grassel has not alleged any facts that 
suggest those charges are improperly motivated. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant Grassel's exceptions, in part, and affirm the 
ALJ's decision dismissing the amended charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 17, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
(? 
<2^ 
y Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Elwood Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge, dated July 19, 2007, filed by the United Public Service 
Employees Union (UPSEU) alleging that the District violated §§209-a. 1(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it eliminated a position of 
Maintenance Mechanic II held by UPSEU shop steward and activist David DeSimone 
(DeSimone) and terminated him in retaliation for his protected activities. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding that UPSEU demonstrated 
that the adverse employment action taken against DeSimone by the District was 
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unlawfully motivated under the Act and ordered his reinstatement to his former position 
along with make-whole relief.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the District asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
UPSEU met its burden of presenting sufficient direct and/or circumstantial evidence to 
demonstrate that the District was improperly motivated under the Act when it eliminated 
DeSimone's position and terminated him. As part of its exceptions, the District 
challenges the ALJ's reliance on statements of unlawful motivation attributed to Plant 
Facilities Administrator Michael Butler (Butler), who the District asserts did not have 
authority to make personnel decisions. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ erred in 
concluding that the District's proffered reason for its conduct toward DeSimone was 
pretextual. UPSEU supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm but modify the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
UPSEU represents a unit composed of all District maintenance and custodial 
employees including Chief Custodian, Maintenance Mechanic (MM) II, III and IV, 
Custodial Worker (CW) I and II, Driver/Messenger and Head Custodian with substitutes 
and seasonal employees excluded.2 The District and UPSEU are parties to a 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) for the period July 1, 2004-June 30, 
2008. It is undisputed that in seven years of representation, UPSEU has been able to 
1
 42 PERB H4551 (2009). 
2
 Joint Exhibit 1, Art. I. 
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resolve contractual issues informally with the District without filing written grievances. 
In October 2005, the District hired DeSimone as a temporary MM II, and assigned 
him to perform maintenance duties in the District's four schools: two elementary schools, 
a middle school and a high school. Although the posting stated that the position would 
have a Monday-Friday schedule, when District Assistant Superintendent for Human 
Resources Robert Annucci (Annucci) offered him the position, DeSimone was informed 
that he would be working a Tuesday-Saturday schedule. 
In February 2006, the District appointed DeSimone to a permanent MM II 
position on a District-wide maintenance crew. Following his permanent appointment, 
DeSimone objected to his Tuesday-Saturday schedule citing a provision of the parties' 
agreement limiting the application of that schedule to two new hires.3 Initially, the 
contract issue was raised with Plant Facilities Administrator Butler and maintenance 
supervisor MM IV Ed Kirby (Kirby). Thereafter, DeSimone contacted UPSEU 
representative Randy Tillman (Tillman) who arranged a meeting with Assistant 
Superintendent Annucci, attended by both Tillman and DeSimone, to discuss the issue. 
The meeting did not result in a change to DeSimone's schedule, and UPSEU and 
DeSimone chose not to pursue the issue through a formal written grievance. 
Beginning in June 2006, and continuing over the next two months, DeSimone 
publicly expressed an interest in becoming a shop steward to replace a unit member who 
had resigned from one of the two elected UPSEU steward positions. In mid-August 
2006, Butler summoned DeSimone to his office about an uncompleted work assignment 
3
 Joint Exhibit 1, Art. V, 1JF. 
4
 Transcript, pp. 110-113,180-183. 
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in an elementary school. During the meeting, Butler told DeSimone that he should stop 
complaining about work and that he should not be involved in union activities. In 
addition, Butler stated that DeSimone was still on probation and that he should be careful 
because he may lose his job. As a result of these comments, DeSimone insisted upon a 
meeting with Annucci. At that meeting, DeSimone repeated to Annucci the content of his 
conversation with Butler and told Annucci that he felt threatened by Butler's statements. 
During his testimony, Annucci did not refute, in any manner, DeSimone's description of 
the meeting including his "replay" for Annucci of DeSimone's conversation with Butler.5 
In late September or early October 2006, DeSimone was elected UPSEU shop 
steward. In the autumn of 2006, Butler transferred DeSimone to work with Chief 
Custodian John Piersa (Piersa) in the high school. Prior to the transfer, Butler told 
Piersa that DeSimone is a troublemaker and a problem, and he directed Piersa to 
document and discipline DeSimone for any deficiencies in his job performance. In 
response to an inquiry from Piersa, Butler did not explain his reasoning or motivation for 
the directive. For the remainder of the 2006-07 school year, DeSimone worked at the 
high school performing custodial and maintenance duties in that school to the 
satisfaction of Piersa, the high school principal, and teachers. According to Piersa, it is 
common for MM II employees to be assigned custodial duties in the absence of a 
custodial employee. 
During an October 2006 meeting, Tillman introduced DeSimone as a shop 
steward to the District's Assistant Superintendent of Business William Pastore 
5
 Transcript, p. 129. In addition, Annucci did not identify any action that he took in 
response to Butler's comments to DeSimone. 
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(Pastore).6 According to Annucci, he first learned of DeSimone's election to a UPSEU 
steward position one month later.7 
In February 2007, a preliminary budget for the 2007-08 school year was presented 
at a District budget meeting by Superintendent of Schools William Swart (Swart) 
proposing the elimination of one custodial position and one maintenance position in the 
UPSEU unit through attrition.8 Under the plan, developed by Superintendent Swart and 
Assistant Superintendent Annucci, the two positions would be cut following a retirement 
or resignation. Prior to the preliminary budget being presented, MM IV Edward Kirby had 
already retired. In addition, it was anticipated that CW I Giuseppe Buffalino (Buffalino) 
would be retiring and CW I Ryan Raleigh (Raleigh) would be resigning to join the military. 
After downloading the District's powerpoint slides from the internet, which 
described the District's preliminary budget, DeSimone prepared an open letter on behalf 
of the unit criticizing the District's plan to eliminate the two positions citing previous cuts 
to the maintenance and custodial staff and increases in the scope of work. DeSimone 
distributed the letter via email to Swartz, members of the District's Board of Education 
and unit members. In addition, he posted it on his locker door where it could be seen by 
unit employees, teachers and administrators. 
6
 Transcript, pp. 217-218. 
7
 According to Annucci, he was advised during a telephone conversation with shop 
steward Anthony Gallo that DeSimone was elected as an assistant shop steward to 
represent night employees. Transcript, p. 229. 
8
 The powerpoint presentation of the preliminary budget proposal presented by 
Superintendent Swart at the budget meeting states: 
Custodial (retirement) -(1.0) 
Buildings and Grounds (retirement) -(1.0) 
Charging Party Exhibit 1, p. 21. 
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The final paragraph of the letter states, in part: 
We realize that we need to be a more public voice until we 
are treated fairly and given both the manpower and the tools 
to do our job. We will no longer sit idly by being treated this 
way. We not only need to have the 2 Custodial/ Maintenance 
positions filled but we need more to keep our schools safe 
and clean and continue our push to help keep the Elwood 
School District a place we can all be proud of.9 
Following distribution of the letter, Butler told DeSimone that the letter was a bad 
idea, that recipients perceived it as a ploy to get more money, and that DeSimone was 
lucky to have a job. Despite Butler's comments, DeSimone began organizing 
opposition to the proposed staff reductions through discussions with unit members 
during lunch breaks and after work. In addition, a unit executive committee was formed 
with DeSimone as a member. In April 2007, the unit executive committee, along with 
Tillman, met with Superintendent Swart, Assistant Superintendents Annucci and 
Pastore, and Board of Education Vice-President Joseph Fusaro, to follow-up on the 
content of the open letter criticizing the proposed elimination of two positions. 
In addition, DeSimone and other executive committee members regularly 
attended District budget meetings from March through June 2007 where they lobbied 
Board members. 
In June 2007, Annucci refused DeSimone's request for the scheduling of a labor-
management meeting asserting that shop steward Gallo should contact him. When the 
labor-management meeting took place on June 27, 2007, Tillman brought with him a 
letter from UPSEU formally advising the District of DeSimone's authority as a shop 
steward. However, the subject of the letter became moot when Annucci announced 
9
 Charging Party Exhibit 2. 
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that the District was laying off DeSimone from his MM II position. 
According to Annucci, the decision to lay-off DeSimone was made during an 
unspecified meeting between Swart, Annucci, Pastore and Butler. Annucci testified that 
the anticipated vacancy in a CWI position had not occurred by the end of the 2006-07 
school year. The District chose to eliminate an MM II position because the District had 
eliminated one CW I position in each of the prior two school years and UPSEU had 
argued against further custodial staff reductions. According to Annucci, DeSimone was 
selected to be laid off because he was the least senior MM II. 
On cross-examination, Annucci acknowledged that in the 2006-07 school year, 
the District employed Christian Haack (Haack) as a daily substitute maintenance 
employee. It is undisputed that Haack performed maintenance duties similar to those 
performed by DeSimone. Unlike unit employees, temporary employees are not subject 
to approval by the Board of Education. The District continues to employ Haack as a 
substitute performing maintenance and custodial duties. 
Following his lay-off, DeSimone applied unsuccessfully for vacant CW I positions in 
the two elementary schools and the middle school. Two of those vacancies resulted from 
Raleigh's resignation in August 2007 and Buffalino's subsequent retirement. Each vacancy 
was filled by another candidate on the recommendation of Plant Facilities Administrator 
Butler following interviews conducted by Butler and the respective school administrators. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-established that a charging party in an improper practice charge alleging a 
violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act has the burden to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of evidence that: a) the affected individual engaged in protected activity . 
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under the Act; b) such activity was known to the person or persons taking the employment 
action; and c) the employment action would not have been taken "but for" the protected 
activity.10 
Proof of unlawful motivation in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act can be 
demonstrated through direct evidence such as a statement by a decision-maker expressing 
an intent to discriminate.11 When direct evidence of discriminatory motivation under the 
Act is introduced, the burden then shifts to the respondent to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the protected activity under the Act was not a motivating factor. 
However, as we recognized in United Federation of Teachers (Jenkins)?2 it is far 
more common for a charging party to rely upon circumstantial evidence, such as 
disparate treatment, in an effort at demonstrating unlawful motivation under the Act. 
The circumstantial evidence presented to prove a prima facie case must give rise to an 
inference that "but for" the protected activity the employer would not have engaged in 
the adverse employment action. If sufficient circumstantial evidence is introduced to 
10Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), 41 PERB P024 
(2008); United Fedn of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB 1J3007 
(2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 41 PERB 
H7007 (Sup Ct New York County 2008) affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB 1J7008 (1s t Dept 
2009); State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB 1J3033 (2008); County of 
Wyoming, 34 PERB P042 (2001); Stockbridge Valley Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3007 
(1993); County of Orleans, 25 PERB fl3010 (1992); Town of Independence, 23 PERB 
H3020 (1990); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB P012 (1985). 
11
 United Fedn of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), supra note 11; Town of 
Hempstead, 19 PERB p022 (1986); Vil of New Paltz, 25 PERB H3032 (1992); Hudson 
Valley Community Coll, 25 PERB P039 (1992); County of Nassau, 35 PERB P045 
(2002), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 2 AD3d 1197, 
36 PERB ^7019 (3d Dept 2003). 
12
 Supra note 11. 
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establish such an inference, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to rebut 
the inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that its conduct was motivated by a 
legitimate non-discriminatory business reason.13 If the respondent presents evidence 
of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to the charging 
party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. At all 
times, however, the burden of proof rests with the charging party to establish the 
requisite causation under the Act by a preponderance of evidence. 
In the present case, we reject the District's contention that Butler's various anti-
union statements constitute stray remarks that are not probative of the allegations of 
the charge.14 The record establishes that Butler is a District administrator with the 
authority to make District personnel decisions, and he can influence the decisions of 
other District administrators. In addition to ordering DeSimone's transfer to the high 
school, Butler directly participated in the lay-off decision, and made three 
recommendations to the District to hire applicants other than DeSimone as a CW I. 
At the same time, we conclude the ALJ erred by treating Butler's various anti-
union statements as direct evidence, rather than circumstantial evidence, of the 
District's motivation. While Butler's anti-union statements are probative of the District's 
motivation because he participated in the lay-off decision, his statements were not 
sufficiently proximate to that decision to be treated as direct evidence. Therefore, we 
modify the ALJ's decision and apply the shifting burdens analysis applicable in 
13
 State of New York (Division of Parole), supra note 11; State of New York (SUNYat 
Buffalo), 33 PERB P020 (2000). 
14
 See, Roadway Package System, Inc., 299 NLRB 458 (1990); Tomassi v Insignia 
Financial Group, Inc. 478 F3d 111,115-116 (2d Cir 2007). 
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circumstantial evidence cases involving allegations of improper motivation. 
A. UPSEU Established a Prima Facie Case of Union Animus 
Contrary to the District's claim, DeSimone engaged in protected activities under 
the Act when he challenged his schedule under the terms of the agreement and when 
he objected to Butler's anti-union comments during a conversation over a work 
assignment. The evidence establishes that as a result of DeSimone's contractual 
dispute over his schedule in 2006, UPSEU representative Tillman and DeSimone met 
with Annucci to discuss the contract issue. Although no formal written grievance was 
subsequently filed, DeSimone's obtaining of UPSEU representation to assist in 
presenting the contractual issue to Annucci is a protected activity under the Act. 
During the course of DeSimone's efforts to become a UPSEU shop steward, 
Butler had a conversation with DeSimone about an uncompleted job assignment. 
During that conversation, Butler told DeSimone that he should stop complaining and 
that he should not engage in union activities because his job may be in jeopardy. The 
substance of Butler's comments was reported to Annucci immediately following the 
conversation. The comments demonstrate Butler's knowledge of DeSimone's union 
activities and they constitute a threat of adverse consequences should he continue to 
engage in those activities.15 
While a mere discussion between a supervisor and a subordinate about an 
uncompleted job assignment is not protected, we conclude that DeSimone's reporting of 
Butler's anti-union comments to Annucci is protected under the Act. The reporting of 
such comments serves to effectuate the right to organization granted to public employees 
15
 See, Village of New Paltz, supra note 12. 
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by §202 of the Act because it provides an employer with an opportunity to investigate, 
and to take appropriate remedial action to ensure the employer's compliance with its 
obligations under the Act.16 
The record establishes that Assistant Superintendents Pastore and Annucci 
became aware of DeSimone's status as an elected unit representative in October and 
November 2006, respectively. Therefore, the District's contention that UPSEU did not 
formally provide it with notification about DeSimone's representational status, and that 
Annucci believed DeSimone to be an assistant shop steward, are irrelevant based upon 
the District's actual knowledge of DeSimone's status. 
A week prior to DeSimone's transfer to the high school, Butler described 
DeSimone as a troublemaker and directed Piersa to document any deficiencies in 
DeSimone's job performance. In response to Piersa's inquiry, Butler failed to provide 
any rationale for the directive. During the hearing, the District did not present any 
evidence to controvert Piersa's testimony that Butler's directive is inconsistent with 
District practices, which suggests DeSimone was targeted for his protected activities. 
After Superintendent Swart and others within the District received DeSimone's 
email with the February 2007 letter criticizing the District's plan to eliminate a 
maintenance position and a custodial position through attrition, Butler told DeSimone 
that the letter was a bad idea and that he was lucky to have a job. 
Following distribution of the February 2007 letter criticizing the proposed personnel 
16
 See, Board ofEduc of the City School Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), supra 
note 10. However, the reporting of coercive and discriminatory statements to an 
employer does not constitute a prerequisite under the Act for the filing and the 
processing of an improper practice charge. 
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cuts, DeSimone continued to engage in protected activities aimed at persuading the District 
to fill the positions scheduled to be left vacant at the end of the school year. He helped to 
organize a unit executive committee that met with Swart, Annucci and Pastore over the 
scheduled cuts, engaged in lobbying with Board members and attempted to schedule a 
labor-management meeting with Annucci. It is undisputed that Annucci refused to schedule 
a meeting directly with DeSimone, which supports an inference of anti-union animus. 
The failure of the District to abolish the position held by Haack constitutes evidence of 
disparate treatment. It is undisputed that Haack has no seniority rights under the agreement 
and the elimination of his position was not subject to Board of Education approval. 
Finally, the District's reliance on Butler's recommendation not to rehire DeSimone 
as CW I, despite the quality of his custodial and maintenance work in the high school, is 
further evidence of improper motivation. We note that during the hearing the District did 
not call as witnesses Butler or other school administrators who conducted the interviews 
that led to Butler recommending candidates other than DeSimone for the vacancies.17 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that UPSEU established a prima facie 
case of improper motivation under the Act.18 We next turn to the District's exceptions 
challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the District's non-discriminatory justification is 
pretextual. 
17
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB 1J3033, n.15 (2008). 
18
 Based upon the District's actual knowledge of DeSimone's protected activity, we do 
not reach the District's exception challenging the ALJ's application of the small plant 
doctrine. See generally, City of Corning, 17 PERB 1J3022 (1984); Hadley Mfg Corp, 108 
LRB 1641 (1954). 
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B. The District's Non-Discriminatory Reason for Its Termination of DeSimone -
Is Pretextual 
During his testimony, Annucci stated that the District decided to eliminate 
DeSimone's position after learning that a vacancy in a custodial position would not take 
place at the end of the 2006-07 school year. Following a review of the record, we affirm the 
ALJ's conclusion that this proffered reason for abolishing DeSimone's position is pretexutal. 
Significantly, Annucci did not articulate any explanation for the District eliminating the 
permanent MM II position held by DeSimone while at the same time continuing to employ 
substitute Haack on a regular basis to perform maintenance duties despite Haack's lack of 
any contractual protections. 
In addition, Annucci did not set forth any clear financial or managerial explanation 
for the District's deviation from its original plan to eliminate one custodial and one 
maintenance position. The assertion that the District chose not to eliminate the custodial 
position as planned because of prior custodial cuts, and UPSEU's opposition to further 
custodial and maintenance cuts, is simply not credible. In its proposed budget, the District 
included the elimination of a custodial position despite the earlier cuts. The evidence 
reveals that UPSEU and its members opposed the elimination of both maintenance and 
custodial positions due to the prior elimination of some of those positions, and the increase 
in maintenance and custodial duties. 
Finally, the pretextual nature of the District's explanation of its termination of 
DeSimone is demonstrated by its repeated decision not to rehire him during the 2007-
08 school year despite a work record of satisfactorily performing custodial and 
maintenance duties at the high school. Instead, as noted by the ALJ, one of the vacant 
CWI positions was filled by the District with a substitute custodian and another vacant 
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position was filled by a District part-time employee. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the District failed 
to meet its burden of persuasion of demonstrating a non-pretextual reason for its 
conduct toward DeSimone and, therefore, we conclude that UPSEU met its burden of 
proof demonstrating that the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Offer DeSimone reinstatement to the position of Maintenance Mechanic 
II within the District; 
2. Make DeSimone whole for lost wages or benefits, if any, suffered as a 
result of his termination from employment effective June 27, 2007, until 
the effective date of the offer of reinstatement, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate, but offset by any earnings he received from other 
employment that he did not hold at the time he was employed for the 
District; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to post 
notices to employees in UPSEU's bargaining unit. 
DATED: March 17, 2010 
Albany, New York 
'JUwyyu^ 
Jerome Lefkpwitz/Chalrman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all employees of the Elwood Union Free School District (District) in the 
unit represented by United Public Service Employees Union that the District will: 
1. Offer DeSimone reinstatement to the position of Maintenance Mechanic II 
within the District; and 
2. Make DeSimone whole for lost wages or benefits, if any, suffered as a result 
of his termination from employment effective June 27, 2007, until the 
effective date of the offer of reinstatement, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate, but offset by any earnings he received from other employment 
that he did not hold at the time he was employed for the District. 
Dated By 
on behalf of the ELWOOD UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 118, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-5796 
- and -
TOWN OF WALWORTH, 
Employer. 
CHAMBERLAIN D'AMANDA OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD LLP (ROBERT 
G. MCCARTHY of counsel), for Petitioner 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (CRAIG M. 
ATLAS of counsel), for Employer 
") BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Town of Walworth 
(Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), on a petition filed by 
Teamsters Local 118, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters), as 
amended, seeking certification of a unit of all Town full-time and part-time Motor 
Equipment Operator (MEO) employees. 
Following the submission of offers of proof and a stipulated record by the parties, 
the ALJ issued a decision concluding that it is appropriate to include the Deputy 
Highway Superintendent in a unit of full-time and part-time Town.MEO employees.1 
1
 42 PERB 1J4011 (2009). Before the ALJ, the parties stipulated to the appropriateness 
of a unit of full-time and part-time Town MEO employees excluding seasonal 
employees. Joint Exhibit 1, Stipulated Record, 1|40. However, the Town objects to the 
inclusion of the MEO employee who has been appointed Deputy Highway 
Superintendent. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Town asserts in its exceptions that the position of Deputy Highway 
Superintendent should not be included in a unit of Town MEO employees. It contends 
that the legal status of the Deputy Highway Superintendent position requires the 
position to be excluded. In addition, it claims that the duties performed by the 
incumbent in the position renders it managerial or confidential under the criteria set forth 
in §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Alternatively, the 
Town contends that inclusion of the position creates a supervisory conflict of interest. 
FACTS 
Within the Town Highway Department there are nine employees, including Kevin 
Switzer (Switzer), who hold MEO positions. 
The current Superintendent of Highways is Michael Frederes (Frederes), who is 
an elected official with the powers and responsibilities set forth in state law.2 If an 
employee organization is recognized or certified to represent Highway Department 
employees, it is anticipated that Frederes will play a direct role in negotiations on behalf 
of the Town. In addition, Frederes may have a major role in contract and personnel 
administration. His current duties already include personnel administration in the 
Highway Department. 
On an annual basis, since January 2005, the Town Board has appointed Switzer 
to be the Deputy Highway Superintendent, which does not adversely affect his status as 
2
 See, Town Law §32; Highway Law §140, et seq. 
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an MEO.3 
As Deputy Highway Superintendent, Switzer reports to Frederes and consults 
with him regarding the work that needs to be completed. Since Switzer's initial 
appointment as Deputy Highway Superintendent, Frederes's longest absence from work 
has not exceeded two weeks. When Frederes is absent, he leaves written operational 
instructions for Switzer. During such absences, Switzer may exercise his own 
discretion with respect to matters that are not covered by the instructions. When 
Frederes is unreachable, Switzer is notified of an emergency. If both Frederes and 
Switzer are unreachable, another MEO will be contacted about the emergency. Switzer 
is responsible for attempting to resolve complaints from Town residents, and to refer 
unresolved complaints to Frederes. 
On a daily basis, Switzer supervises and works with a crew of employees. In that 
role, he issues MEO work assignments, directs the proper performance of MEO duties, 
and is. expected to work alongside the crew in performing many of those duties. 
However, he does not have the responsibility to assign work to other MEO employees 
who are not on his crew. 
Switzer has not participated in interviews of candidates for Highway Department 
employment. Although he has the authority to impose discipline in Frederes's absence, 
Switzer has never disciplined or formally evaluated Highway Department employees. 
He provides Frederes with information and recommendations about MEO employees. 
For example, Frederes reassigned two employees as a result of Switzer's 
3
 The stipulated record states the fact that Switzer was reappointed through December 
31, 2009. For purposes of this decision, we will presume that Switzer has been 
reappointed as deputy highway superintendent for 2010. 
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recommendation stemming from the employees fraternizing rather than working. On 
one occasion, Frederes asked Switzer to witness the counseling of two employees who 
had had a verbal altercation. 
Switzer has the authority to contact employees to perform overtime. He also has 
the authority to sign the payroll in Frederes's absence, to sign vouchers for payment 
and to purchase certain items. As Deputy Highway Superintendent, Switzer has signed 
the payroll and the vouchers for payment on a few occasions. However, he does not 
have direct access to employee records but Frederes would provide him with access 
upon request. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin our discussion with the Town's argument that the Deputy Highway 
Superintendent should be excluded because the position is granted the statutory 
authority to temporarily perform the duties of Superintendent of Highways when he or 
she is absent or unable to perform those duties. 
Pursuant to Town Law §32.2, a Town Board has the authority to create an office 
of Deputy Highway Superintendent, which has the following statutory authority: 
During the absence or inability of the town superintendent 
of highways to act, such deputy shall act and be vested with 
all the powers and duties of the town superintendant of 
highways as provided by law. 
The Deputy Highway Superintendent can be appointed by the Town Board or the 
Superintendent of Highways.4 Although a Deputy Highway Superintendent serves at 
the pleasure of the Superintendent of Highways, the Town Board has the sole legal 
4
 In the present case, Switzer has been appointed and reappointed by the Town Board. 
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authority to set the salary for the position.5 The Superintendent of Highways is granted 
the authority, pursuant to Highway Law §140.4, to appoint and discipline other 
employees in the Highway Department including those holding MEO positions. 
While the statutory authority of a position is relevant to a uniting determination, it 
is not outcome determinative.6 The statutory criteria for determining unit composition 
are those set forth in §207.1 of the Act. Therefore, we reject the Town's argument that 
the legal status of the Deputy Highway Superintendent position constitutes a perse 
basis for the exclusion of the position from the proposed unit. 
Next, we turn to the Town's argument that the Deputy Highway Superintendent 
position should be excluded because Switzer is a managerial or confidential employee 
under the Act.7 
5
 Town Law §32.2. 
6
 See, State of New York-Unified Court System, 22 PERB p051 (1989), pet dismissed, 
Crosson v Newman, 149 Misc.2d 499, 24 PERB U7001 (Sup Ct Albany County 1990), 
aff, 178 AD2d 719, 24 PERB 1J7020 (3d Dept 1991). See also, State of New York 
(Division of Parole), 40 PERB fl3011 (2007) (fragmentation is appropriate for public 
employees who hold police officer titles or hold a title that has police officer powers 
under state law and whose exclusive or predominant duties are the enforcement of the 
State's general criminal laws.) 
7
 Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any person holding a position 
by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that such 
term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other than sections 
two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article, . . . persons who may 
reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board. . . . Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who 
may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is 
not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist and 
act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees described in clause (ii)." 
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A Pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Act, a managerial employee is a person who 
formulates policies on behalf of the employer, or who may reasonably be required to 
assist directly in the preparation and formulation of the employer's negotiation proposals 
or to have a major role in the administration of an agreement or in personnel 
administration.8 An employee will be designated confidential only if he or she assists 
and acts in a confidential capacity to a managerial employee under the Act.9 The 
statutory criteria for such designations are applied strictly, with all uncertainties resolved 
in favor of coverage under the Act. 
The temporary legal authority granted to a Deputy Superintendent of Highways in 
the absence of the Superintendent of Highways, under Town Law §32.2, does not 
render the person holding the position managerial under the Act. In reaching our 
\ conclusion, we note that the Legislature did not include the position of Deputy 
Superintendent of Highways as one of the specific positions that must be designated 
managerial under the Act.10 
In City ofBinghamton,u we set forth the applicable standard for determining 
whether an employee formulates policy, pursuant to §207.1 (a)(i) of the Act: 
To formulate policy is to participate with regularity in the 
essential process involving the determination of the goals 
and objectives of the government involved, and of the 
methods for accomplishing those goals and objectives that 
have a substantial impact upon the affairs and the 
8
 Fashion Institute of Technology, 42 PERB 1J3018 (2009). 
9
 City of Rome, 39 PERB 1J3009 (2006). 
10
 Act, §§201.7(b), (c), (e) and (g). 
11
 12 PERB 1J3099 (1979). 
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constituency of the government. The formulation of policy 
does not extend to the determination of methods of 
operation that are merely of a technical nature.12 
As the ALJ correctly concluded in the present case, the duties performed by 
Switzer do not meet the criteria for a managerial designation under the Act. The 
stipulated record establishes that Switzer does not formulate Town policies or play a 
major role in personnel administration. Switzer has daily supervisory responsibilities for 
a single crew that are the equivalent to the duties of a working foreman. While he has 
the authority to summon employees for overtime and he has signed the payroll and 
vouchers on a few occasions, Switzer does not supervise other Highway Department 
employees. Even during the relatively brief periods of absence by Frederes, Switzer 
does not have substantial and unfettered discretion in making decisions about the 
functioning of the Highway Department. 
In addition, Switzer does not play a major role in employee relations. He does 
not discipline or formally evaluate employees, and he does not have regular direct 
access to employee records. Furthermore, he is not involved in hiring prospective 
employees. The fact that he makes recommendations and expresses his opinions to 
Frederes about employees is an aspect of his supervisory authority but does not 
demonstrate that he has a major role in personnel administration. 
In support of its exceptions, the Town relies upon the Town of Riverheatf3 where 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) designated, 
as managerial, a person holding the position of Deputy Highway Superintendent. 
12
 Supra note 11, 12 PERB at 3185. 
13
 24 PERB H4052(1991). 
Case No. C-5796 
- 8 -
However, that designation was on consent and it was based solely upon the allegations 
of the employer's application that are not set forth in the Director's decision. Therefore, 
the Director's decision in Town ofRiverhead is unpersuasive.14 
Based upon the record, we also conclude that Switzer is not a confidential 
employee under the Act. Although it is undisputed that the duties performed by 
Frederes would warrant a managerial designation under the Act,15 there is no evidence 
in the record to demonstrate that Switzer assists or acts in a confidential manner to 
Frederes.16 Contrary to the Town's argument, the mere fact that Switzer has provided 
Frederes with information and opinions about employees relevant to evaluations and 
discipline does not constitute evidence warranting a confidential designation under the 
Act. Furthermore, based upon the scope of Switzer's duties, we do not find it 
reasonable to expect that he will be assisting and acting in a confidential manner with 
respect to negotiations and personnel administration following the certification or 
recognition of an employee organization for the Highway Department employees. 
Finally, we reject the Town's contention that the Deputy Superintendent of 
Highways should be excluded based upon an actual or potential supervisory conflict of 
14
 In fact, the Board has certified units composed of a Deputy Highway Superintendent 
and rank and file Highway Department employees. See, Town of Attica, 22 PERB 
P000.29 (1989); Town of Sheldon, 23 PERB P000.22 (1990); Town of Warsaw, 23 
PERB P000.23 (1990); Town of Middlebury, 23 PERB 1J3000.24 (1990); Town of Perry 
23 PERB 1J3000.7 (1990); Town of Pike, 24 PERB fl3000.08 (1991). In other cases, we 
have certified units that exclude the Deputy Highway Superintendent. Town of 
Colchester, 41 PERB P000.06 (2008); Town ofCazenovia, 41 PERB 1J3000.03 (2008); 
Town of Concord, 40 PERB H3000.09 (2007). 
15
 Joint Exhibit 1, Stipulated Record, 1J35. 
16
 See, Town of Dewitt, 32 PERB 1f 3001 (1999). 
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interest. 
In St. Paul Boulevard Fire Districf7, we reiterated that: 
The factors that are considered in determining 
whether a community of interest exists include the 
similarity of the terms and conditions of employment, 
shared mission and duties, and common work 
location. The existence of disparities in benefits is not 
a sufficient basis for the exclusion of an 
unrepresented employee when other facts, such as 
shared duties and responsibilities, establish a 
community of interest. When the uniting question 
involves an unrepresented supervisor, the Board also 
examines whether the extent and nature of the 
assigned supervisory functions create a conflict of 
interests, thereby outweighing other facts that may 
support inclusion. Among the significant supervisory 
duties that may indicate such a conflict of interests is 
the authority to impose discipline, initiate disciplinary 
procedures, conduct formal evaluations, render first 
step decisions on contract grievances and provide 
supervision over day-to-day operations.18 (citations 
omitted) 
In the present case, Switzer's daily responsibilities over the work performed by a 
single crew of Highway Department employees do not create a conflict of interests that 
outweigh the community of interests between him and the other full-time and part-time 
MEO employees. Switzer works directly with members of the crew including performing 
MEO duties. In addition, his limited supervisory duties do not include initiating 
discipline, formally evaluating employees or participating in making hiring decisions. 
Finally, based upon his actual duties, we find his temporary legal authority to act in the 
absence of the Superintendant of Highways to be insufficient to demonstrate a conflict 
17
 42 PERB H3009 at 3028 (2009). 
18
 Supra, note 17, 42 PERB at 3028. 
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of interests.19 
We accordingly affirm the decision of the ALJ that it is appropriate to place the 
title of Deputy Highway Superintendent in a collective bargaining in the unit with full-time 
and part-time MEO employees in the Town's Highway Department. 
DATED: March 17, 2010 
Albany, New York
 A 
Jerome LefkowiteT Chairman 
<<*Jj)i££_ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
*<2. 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
19
 See, Town of Attica, 22 PERB tf4031 (1989). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 118, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5927 
TOWN OF MENDON, 
Employer. 
DAVID W. WEILER, for Petitioner 
SHELDON W. BOYCE, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 25, 2009, the Teamsters Local 118, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Town of Mendon (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time MEOs, HEOs, Lead Mechanic, Mechanic Assistant, 
Laborer and Buildings and Grounds Manager. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent, Deputy Highway Superintendent, 
Foreman and all others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on March 1, 2010, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 17,2010 
Albany, New York 
/ /Jerome Lefkov^tz, Chapman 
/
 Robert S. Hite, Member 
' Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5919 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE CENTRE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
1
 By letter dated November 18, 2009, the incumbent bargaining agent, Rockville Centre 
Village Employees Civil Service Association, Inc., has disavowed any interest in 
representing the existing bargaining unit. 
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and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time employees in the following titles: 
Account Clerk, Accounts Investigator, Administrative Assistant, 
Apprentice Line Maintainer, Assistant Motor Repair Supervisor, 
Assistant Oiler, Assistant Power Plant Operator, Assistant 
Sanitation Supervisor, Automotive Mechanic, Building Custodian, 
Building Inspector, Building Inspector-Trainee, Cable Splicer, 
Caretaker, Cashier, Cleaner, Clerk, Clerk-Laborer, Designer 
Drafter, Drafter, Drafting Aider (Utility), Driver Ground Helper 
(Utility), Electric Meter Repairer, Head Clerk, Highway Supervisor, 
Housing Assistant, Housing Inspector, Labor Supervisor, Line 
Maintainer 1/c, Line Maintainer 2/c, Line Supervisor, Maintainer, 
Maintenance Supervisor, Messenger, Meter Reader (Utility), Meter 
Tester (Utility), Motor Equipment Operator, M.E.O. Sanitation 
Worker, Multiple Housing Inspector, Neighborhood Aide, Nursery 
Manager, Oiler, Park Attendant, Parking Meter Attendant, Parking 
Meter Servicer, Plumbing Inspector, Police Communications 
Operator, Power Plant Laborer, Power Plant Mechanic (Diesel), 
Power Plant Laborer (Electric), Power Plant Servicer, Principal 
Account Clerk, Principal Account Clerk (Utility), Principal Clerk, 
Principal Stenographer, Principal Typists-Clerk, Recreation 
Assistant, Recreation Attendant, Recreation Attendant/Bus Driver, 
Recreation Leader, Sanitation & Parking Violations Inspector, 
Sanitation Supervisor, Sanitation Worker, Secretarial Assistant, 
Security Guard, Senior Account Clerk, Senior Building Inspector, 
Senior Cashier, Senior Citizens Program Development Aide, Senior 
Citizen Social Workers, Senior Clerk, Senior Drafter, Senior Law 
Stenographer, Senior Maintainer, Senior Motor Equipment 
Operator, Senior Parking Meter Servicer, Senior Power Plant 
Operator, Senior Stenographer, Senior Stores Clerk, Senior Typist-
Clerk, Senior Village Court Clerk, Sewer Servicer, Sewer Servicer 
Supervisor, Sign Shop Supervisor, Stenographer, Stock Assistant 
(Utility), Storekeeper (Utility), Stores Clerk (Utility), Typist-Clerk, 
Underground Cable Supervisor, Village Court Clerk, Water 
Servicer, Water Servicer Supervisor, Water Servicer Trainee, and 
Working Line Supervisor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 17,2010 
Albany, New York 
jQHryj^C^ 
Jerome LefkowitzX/hairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EAST IRONDEQUOIT TRANSPORTATION 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NOS. C-5935 & C-5936 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 118, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
EAST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
Two consolidated representation proceedings having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it 
appearing that a negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, > 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the East Irondequoit Transportation Association 
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has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regular Part-time School Bus Drivers and Bus 
Monitors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the East Irondequoit Transportation Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 17,2010 
Albany, New York 
\lM4}tLA^ 
Jerome Lefkoy(?itz, Carman 
Robert S\ Hite, Member 
S Sheila S. Cole, Member 
